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ANALYZING THE REASONABLENESS OF
BODILY INTRUSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to privacy embraces the human body as the
"'first and most basic reference for control over personal
identity.' "" An invasion of this bodily privacy, that is, an
unwanted touching, influences an individual's personal dig-
nity. However, not every unwanted touching, no matter how
minor, should be considered a violation of the self.2 It is
appropriate, therefore, that the protection of the right to pri-
vacy distinguish between serious invasions which threaten
one's dignity and minor invasions which should not. The
fourth amendment 3 affords such protection against unwar-
ranted governmental intrusions.
The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures is the most fundamental protection
afforded the right to privacy.4 This constitutional right pro-
tects persons who exhibit an actual expectation of privacy
that society recognizes as reasonable.5 However, a legitimate
expectation of privacy is not enough to render an invasion
violative of the fourth amendment. The search or seizure
must also be unreasonable under the particular facts and cir-
1. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-9, at 913 (1978) (quoting
Gerety, Rede.fining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 266 & n.119 (1977)).
2. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 15-9, at 913.
3. The fourth amendment provides in part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This prohibition is
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See infra note 13. See
infra note 19 for the United States Supreme Court's rejection of a fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination argument.
4. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734-35 (2d ed.
1983) ("The phrase ['right to privacy'] ... has several meanings in terms of constitu-
tional analysis. The oldest constitutional right to privacy is that protected by the
fourth amendment's restriction on governmental searches and seizures."). "The over-
riding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966).
5. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The principal remedy for an unreasonable
search and seizure by the government is to exclude the illegally procured evidence
from the criminal prosecution. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal
prosecutions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (state prosecutions).
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cumstances involved.6 Thus, when the government procures
evidence from the body of a criminal suspect or defendant,7
the central question becomes whether the search was rea-
sonable and therefore permissible under the fourth
amendment.
Accordingly, this Comment will focus upon the analysis
of reasonableness in cases involving the removal of evidence
from the human body. The few leading cases will be dis-
cussed,9 and a framework for analysis will be proposed.10
This framework is not designed as a rigid standard. Instead,
it seeks to expose the bases upon which a search may be
found to be unreasonable. The framework must remain
flexible in order to properly evaluate and balance the partic-
ular facts and circumstances presented in a specific case.
6. Sclunerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) ("the Fourth Amendment's
proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intru-
sions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper
manner.").
7. The methods of obta,ning bodily evidence may be classified as nontechnical
procedures, routine medical procedures, and complex medical procedures. Nontech-
nical procedures include cutting hair, scraping under fingernails, taking a saliva or
voluntary urine sample, or swabbing skin with chemically treated cotton. Examples
of routine medical procedures are body cavity examinations and blood tests. Com-
plex medical procedures include induced regurgitation, manual massage of the pros-
tate gland administered through the rectum, and surgery.
For a discussion of a case involving the issue of surgical procurement of evidence
from a victim, see infra note 26.
8. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. See supra note 6. See generally I W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEizuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.6(a) (1978 &
Supp. 1984) (personal characteristics); 2 id. §§ 4.1(d), 5.3(c) (intrusions into and in-
spections of the body); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 15-9 (governmental intrusion on the
body); Eckhardt, Intrusion Into the Body, 52 MIL. L. Rav. 141 (1971); Kroll, Constitu-
tionally Permissible Invasions of the Body, 39 OKLA. B.J. 1904 (1968); McIntyre &
Chabraja, The Intensive Search of a Suspect's Body and Clothing, 58 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 18 (1967); Comment, Search and Seizure: Compelled
Surgical Intrusions?, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 305 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Compelled Surgery]; Comment, Constitutionality of Stomach Searches, 10 U.S.F.L.
REv. 93 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Stomach Searches]; Note, Signficant
Medical Intrusions Under the Military Rules of Evidence, 67 VA. L. Rav. 1069 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Medical Intrusions]; Note, Nonconsensual Surgery: The Un-
kindest Cut of.Al, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 291 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Non-
consensual Surgery].
9. See infra notes 11-37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 38-150.
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II. LEADING CASES
The leading cases involving the removal of bodily evi-
dence" demonstrate the flexibility required for determining
the reasonableness of a particular search. Each decision fo-
cused upon different factors, but each factor is helpful in de-
riving an overall framework.
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Rochin v. California2 that evidence obtained in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteen amendment' 3 was not
admissible in a criminal trial.'4 The police had forcibly en-
tered Rochin's bedroom in search of illegal narcotics and ob-
served him put two capsules into his mouth. After failing to
extract the capsules themselves, the police took Rochin to a
hospital. Pursuant to police direction, a doctor forced an
emetic solution through a tube into Rochin's stomach.
Rochin vomited two morphine capsules which were subse-
quently used in the prosecution against him.' 5 In reversing
the conviction, the Court concluded:
[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained
do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or pri-
vate sentimentalism about combatting crime too energeti-
cally. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to
open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents - this course ofpro-
11. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952); United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). For additional United States Supreme Court decisions,
see South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983) (admission of defendant's refusal to
submit to blood-alcohol test violated neither right against self-incrimination nor due
process); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (visual body cavity searches of pretrial
detainees conducted on less than probable cause were reasonable because of institu-
tion's legitimate security interests); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (fingernail
scraping was reasonable because of destructibility of evidence); Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957) (blood sample by physician while defendant was unconscious
following automobile accident did not shock Court's conscience).
12. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
13. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. The exclusionary rule was not yet applicable to the states. See supra note 5.
15. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166-67.
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ceedings['61 by agents of government to obtain evidence is
bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of
constitutional differentiation.' 7
This focus on the totality of circumstances demonstrates that
the whole character of a search, not just the sum of its as-
pects, must be reasonable.
In Schmerber v. California,18  a 1966 decision, the
Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for operating an auto-
mobile while under the influence of alcohol. The Court held
that the taking of a blood sample for purposes of chemical
analysis was not an unreasonable search and seizure in vio-
lation of the fourth amendment.1 9 After finding probable
cause for Schmerber's arrest, the Court focused on three fac-
tors.2 0 First of all, there was a "clear indication"'2 1 that the
desired evidence would be found.22 Second, a "reasonable
16. The Rochin decision has been interpreted as condemning the whole course of
events rather than the stomach search procedure per se. See, e.g., United States v.
Owens, 475 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); People v. Jones, 20 Cal. App. 3d
201, 97 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1971). See also Comment, Stomach Searches, supra note 8, at
93 ("Although no case has as yet ruled unequivocally that stomach searches per se are
forbidden by the Constitution, the courts have placed extensive limitations on the use
of such a procedure.").
17. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (emphasis added). Justices Black and Douglas filed
separate concurrences, contending that the induced-regurgitation procedure violated
Rochin's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 175 (Black, J.,
concurring); id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
19. Id at 772. The Court also rejected several other bases for reversal. The
Supreme Court adhered to its position in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957),
where it rejected a JRochin due process claim against a similar blood test procedure.
See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760. The Court held that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is limited to evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature. Id. at 761. And the absence of a fifth amendment right precluded a sixth
amendment right to counsel violation. Id at 765-66.
20. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769. The Court excused the search warrant require-
ment because of exigent circumstances, namely the threatened destruction of evi-
dence. Id at 770. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the term, see infra notes 44-52 and accompanying
text.
22. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence
might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evi-
dence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to
suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate
search.
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test" was chosen; it was highly reliable, medically routine,
and virtually without risk, trauma, or pain.23 And finally,
performance of the test, in this case "by a physician in a hos-
pital environment according to accepted medical practices,"
was reasonable.2 4 The Court was careful, however, to limit
its holding:
[W]e reach this judgment only on the facts of the present
record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cher-
ished value of our society. That we today hold that the
Constitution does not forbid the State's minor intrusions
into an individual's body under stringently limited condi-
tions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
The Supreme Court has yet to consider these "more sub-
stantial intrusions" under a fourth amendment analysis.
The foremost case on the issue whether or not a criminal
defendant26 may be compelled to submit to surgery in order
Id at 769-70.
23. Id. at 771. See infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
24. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The Court stated that "serious questions...
would arise if a search involving use of a medical technique, even of the most rudi-
mentary sort, were made by other than medical personnel or in other than a medical
environment .. " Id. at 771-72. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley,
385 F. Supp. 193, 198 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (search of vaginal cavity "abused common
conceptions of decency" where "the two policewomen who perpetrated the search
were not medically trained, nor did they utilize medical facilities or equipment to aid
them in their search, nor was it done in a hospital or medical environment."). See
infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
25. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772. Chief Justice Warren dissented on the basis of
the Rochin due process test. Id. at 772 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Justices Black and
Fortas dissented on the basis of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.
Id. at 773 (Black, J., dissenting); id at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
agreed with both these analyses and further found that the procedure violated both
the penumbra right of privacy under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
and the fourth amendment right to be secure in one's person. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
778-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. In State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713 (1978), rev'g, 141 Ga. App.
688, 234 S.E.2d 406 (1977), it was the victim who was asked to submit to surgery. The
defendant had moved for an order requiring removal of a bullet from the aggravated
assault victim's body. The trial court denied the motion, but the court of appeals
reversed, holding the order would be proper if the trial court found that the surgery
would not be dangerous to the victim. It failed "to see why the state should be able to
acquire [evidence derived from a surgical procedure] against asserted violations of
the constitutional protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments if a criminal de-
fendant is denied the same privilege." 141 Ga. App. at , 234 S.E.2d at 409. The
Georgia Supreme Court, however, perceived such a distinction. In reversing the court
of appeals decision, the supreme court held that the "Fourth Amendment right of the
[Vol. 68:130
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for the prosecution to obtain evidence, such as a bullet,27 is
United States v. Crowder,28 in 1976. There, the defendant
was arrested for the murder and robbery of a dentist. The
police noticed that Crowder himself had bandages on his
right wrist and left thigh. Subsequent X-rays disclosed me-
tallic substances resembling bullets in both locations. A five-
to-four majority of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's order authorizing sur-
gery on Crowder's arm but not his thigh.29 In distinguishing
between the minor surgery utilizing a local anesthetic on the
defendant's arm3° and the major surgery requiring a general
anesthetic for his thigh, the majority noted:
Reasonableness of course is a matter of degree and we do
not say that a court may authorize any challenged opera-
tion, no matter how major .... [W]e are not here called
upon to give general approval of surgical operations in
search of evidence. We are concerned only with the proce-
victim to be secure against an unreasonable search must prevail over the right of the
accused to obtain evidence for his defense." 240 Ga. at - 242 S.E.2d at 715. A
concurrence argued that the motion had to be denied because "there is neither com-
mon law nor statutory authorization for such action - not because the victim's
Fourth Amendment rights prohibit it." Id. at _, 242 S.E.2d at 715 (Hall, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis in original).
27. Lower courts have split on the issue. See Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th
Cir. 1983) (unreasonable), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984); United States v.
Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (reasonable), cert. denied 429 U.S.
1062 (1977); Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974) (unreasonable);
Doe v. State (McCaskill), 409 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam) (reason-
able), cert. denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1982); Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199
S.E.2d 587 (1973) (reasonable), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974); Creamer v. State,
229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (reasonable), cert. deniea 410 U.S. 975 (1973);
Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973) (unreasonable per se), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Hughes v. State, 56 Md. App. 12, 466 A.2d 533 (1983)
(reasonable); State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977) (unreasonable); State v.
Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (reasonable); People v. Smith, 80 Misc.
2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1974) (unreasonable). Except for the Adams decision
which adopted a per se rule, the determinative factor has been the seriousness of the
proposed operation: major surgery necessitating the use of general anesthetic is un-
reasonable, while minor surgery utilizing local anesthetic is reasonable. See generaly
2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.1 at 14-21; Comment, Compelled Surgery, supra note
8, at 309-12; Note, Nonconsensual Surgery, supra note 8, at 296-302.
28. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
29. Id. at 316.
30. The total time of the operation, from scrubbing to closing the incision, was
about ten minutes. And although the procedure could have been done on an out-
patient basis, Crowder was hospitalized for four or five days for observation. Id at
315.
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dures followed in this case. We think those procedures
were reasonable and justified in the circumstances. We re-
peat and summarize the factors that lead us to this conclu-
sion: (1) the evidence sought was relevant, could have
been obtained in no other way, and there was probable
cause to believe that the operation would produce it; (2) the
operation was minor, was performed by a skilled surgeon,
and every possible precaution was taken to guard against
any surgical complications, so that the risk of permanent
injury was minimal; (3) before the operation was per-
formed the District Court held an adversary hearing at
which the defendant appeared with counsel; (4) thereafter
and before the operation was performed the defendant was
afforded an opportunity for appellate review by this
court.3 '
The Crowder decision produced two strident dissenting opin-
ions. Judge Leventhal would have required a strong show-
ing by the prosecution "that the surgical procedure is
necessary in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. '32
And Judge Robinson 33 urged a per se rule prohibiting any
"greater bodily explorations than the ubiquitous needle-in-
sertion permitted in Schmerber.' ' 34 Robinson argued that
surgery was not routine and involved a high degree of risk,
discomfort, and anxiety.35 What both the majority and dis-
senting opinions indicate is that as the degree of bodily in-
trusion increases so must the protection of the fourth
amendment.
None of the above cases have designed a uniform analy-
sis to be employed in all situations where the government
procures evidence from a criminal defendant's body. Invari-
ably, the courts have been wary of transcending the particu-
31. Id at 316.
32. Id. at 318 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). He continued: "No such showing was
made here, in my view. The prosecution may have thought it convenient to extract
the bullet as part of an investigation, but that is not enough." Id See infra notes 70-
82 and accompanying text.
33. Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge Wright joined in the opinion.
34. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 322 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
35. Id at 321. See infra notes 91-102. Robinson also asserted that the bullet had
no evidentiary significance since Crowder never disputed his presence at the scene of
the crime. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 322 (Robinson, J., dissenting). For a related view,
compare Judge Leventhal's need requirement discussed supra note 32 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 68:130
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lar facts and circumstances of the case.36 However, the
courts have focused on four interrelated factors: the evi-
dence, the defendant's right to privacy, society's interest in
prosecuting criminals, and the procedures utilized in the in-
vasion.3 7 Consideration of these four basic elements permits
the assemblage of a framework for analysis.
III. THE FRAMEWORK
In any case involving the removal of evidence from the
body of a criminal defendant, the ultimate question to be
answered is whether, given the facts and circumstances
presented, the search is reasonable.3  However, in order to
arrive at a fair and just determination, five basic components
of reasonableness must be considered: the probability that
the desired evidence might be obtained;39 the relationship of
the evidence to the charges; 40 the degree of bodily intru-
sion;41 procedural safeguards;4 2 and the existence of exigent
circumstances.43
A. What is the Probability that the Desired Evidence Might
be Obtained?
The United States Supreme Court established the "clear
indication" standard in Schmerber v. California:44  there
must exist a clear indication that the desired evidence would
be found during the search.45 Although the precise meaning
of the term is not self-evident, clear indication most logically
46requires something more than probable cause. Indeed, in
36. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 25 & 31.
37. See supra notes 12-35 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 124-50 and accompanying text.
44. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
45. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. For the Court's language, see supra note 22.
46. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.1(d), at 12. Accord People v. Williams, 192
Colo. 249, ._ 557 P.2d 399, 406 (1976) ("Rather Schmerber established a higher,
more protective standard for these attempts to find evidence within the body. To
protect human dignity such internal body searches may be made only where, in addi-
tion to the probable cause supporting the arrest, there exists a 'clear indication' to
believe that relevant evidence will be obtained."). Contra Rivas v. United States, 368
1984]
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Schmerber there was a very high probability that a blood
sample would disclose an illegal blood-alcohol content since
the defendant had crossed a road and struck a tree while
returning from a night of drinking at a tavern.47
The Court would have been faced with a different situa-
tion if a significant amount of time had elapsed from the
time drinking stopped to the time the blood sample was
taken because "the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins
to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body func-
tions to eliminate it from the system." 48 An analogous situa-
tion arises in surgery cases where a bullet may be
unidentifiable even if removed. 49 In denying a request to
compel the defendant to undergo surgery, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in Lee v. Winston5" that "[a] bullet
inside the human body deteriorates, the rate of deterioration
dependent upon the time the bullet is inside the body and
also upon the body chemistry of the wounded person. '"51
Clearly, searches which have a great potential for disclosing
F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966) (border search case defining "clear indication" as something
less than probable cause).
47. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. Accord People v. Duemig, - Colo. _ 620
P.2d 240 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981) (blood test taken following automo-
bile accident in which defendant drove off road). See also State v. Carthan, 377 So.
2d 308 (La. 1979) (gonorrhea test performed on defendant after semen taken from
rape victim was found to contain gonorrhea); People v. Holloway, 416 Mich. 288, 330
N.W.2d 405 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1900 (1983) (extraction of heroin packets
from defendant's mouth after police officers noticed defendant's uncharacteristic si-
lence, defendant's chewing, and several film cannisters, frequently used in the drug
trade, between defendant's legs on carseat).
48. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. Accord People v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 557
P.2d 399 (1976) (no evidence defendant drank anything or how much or when).
Where a blood sample will be used for comparison of blood types, the blood found at
the scene of the crime must be known to be of human origin, and not from the vic-
tim's body. E.g., United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972); State v.
Acquin, 177 Conn. 352, 416 A.2d 1209 (1979) (per curiam); Cole v. Parr, 595 P.2d
1349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
49. Or where the firearm may be unidentifiable. See, e.g., State v. Haynie, 240
Ga. 866, _ 242 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1978).
50. 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
51. Id at 901 n.15. The bullet had been in the defendant's chest for nine months.
But see Doe v. State (McCaskill), 409 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1982) (minor surgery authorized despite fact that bullet
had been in defendant's leg for five and one-half years).
[Vol. 68:130
BODILY INTR USIONS
useless evidence do not meet the clear indication require-
ment as enunciated in Schmerber 2
B. How Essential is the Evidence to a Fair Determination
of the Charges?
The relationship between the evidence sought to be ob-
tained and the offense charged against the defendant has a
bearing on the reasonableness of a search. 3 Certainly, the
desired evidence must be relevant to the prosecution of the
case.5 4  For example, saliva55 and semen 56 samples taken
from a defendant may be relevant evidence in a sexual as-
sault trial. A murder victim's blood, skin, or hair particles
found under the defendant's fingernails5 7 or the victim's bul-
let lodged in the defendant's body58 would be relevant to the
identity of an assailant. A blood sample may help prove
identity when it is compared to blood, other than the vic-
tim's, 59 found at the scene of a crime.6 Blood 6 1 and urine62
samples can disclose the presence of controlled substances in
52. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (govern-
ment failed to establish that blood and hair were evidence of an armed bank robbery);
State v. Acquin, 177 Conn. 352, 416 A.2d 1209 (1979) (per curiam) (government failed
to establish that substance on alleged murder weapons was in fact blood); Cole v.
Parr, 595 P.2d 1349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (government failed to establish any ra-
tional connection between hair, blood, saliva, and semen samples in its possession
and the samples sought from the defendant).
53. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) ("There must, of course be a
nexus. . . between the item to be seized and criminal behavior.").
54. United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Cole v. Parr, 595 P.2d 1349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
56. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876
(1978); McClain v. State, __ Ind. __ 410 N.E.2d 1297 (1980); State v. Carthan, 377 So.
2d 308 (La. 1979); Cole v. Parr, 595 P.2d 1349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
57. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); United States ex re. Parson
v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Del. 1972), a f'dper curiam, 481 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072 (1973).
58. See, e.g., Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
1906 (1984); United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974);
Doe v. State (McCaskill), 409 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1982); Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974); Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 975 (1973); Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Hughes v. State, 56 Md. App. 12, 466 A.2d
533 (1983); State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977); People v. Smith, 80 Misc.
2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1974).
59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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63 64the body. Searches of a defendant's mouth,6  vagina,
anus, 65 and stomach66 may expose concealed evidence of
crime, particularly evidence of drug offenses. Gunpowder 67
or dynamite68 residue on a defendant's hands may be rele-
vant to the identity of a criminal offender. A hair sample
may be relevant evidence whenever hair found at the scene
of a crime most likely belongs to the criminal offender.69
But a finding of relevancy does not end the inquiry.
60. See, e.g., Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960
(1970); State v. Acquin, 177 Conn. 352, 416 A.2d 1209 (1979) (per curiam); Ferguson
v. State, 573 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979).
61. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957); United States v. Harvey, 701 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1983); People v.
Duemig, - Colo. __ 620 P.2d 240 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); People v.
Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 557 P.2d 399 (1976).
62. See, e.g., Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 851 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
876 (1980); People v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 557 P.2d 399 (1976); Ewing v. State,
160 Ind. App. 138, 310 N.E.2d 571 (1974).
63. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 155 Ariz. 530, 566 P.2d 678 (1977); Foxall v. State,
157 Ind. App. 19, 298 N.E.2d 470 (1973); State v. Jacques, 225 Kan. 38, 587 P.2d 861
(1978); People v. Holloway, 416 Mich. 288, 330 N.W.2d 405 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1900 (1983); State v. Santos, 101 N.J. Super. 98, 243 A.2d 274 (1968); Hernandez
v. State, 548 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
64. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); United States ex rel. Guy v.
McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974); State v. Clark, __ Hawaii _ 654 P.2d
355 (1982); State v. Fontenot, 383 So. 2d 365 (La. 1980). For a discussion of searches
of the vagina at American borders, see generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 10.5(c).
65. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). For a discussion of searches of
the anus at American borders, see generally, 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 10.5(c).
66. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); United States v. Owens,
475 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745
(S.D. Cal. 1949); People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr.
528 (1975); People v. Rodriguez, 71 Cal. App. 3d 547, 139 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977);
People v. Jones, 20 Cal. App. 3d 201, 97 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1971). For a discussion of
searches of the stomach at American borders, see generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note
8, § 10.5(c).
67. See e.g., Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219, 275 S.E.2d 29, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
882 (1981).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1010 (1974).
69. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mills), 686 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.) (hair
found in ski mask worn by bank robber), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 386 (1982); United
States v. Weir, 657 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (hair found in ski mask
worn by bank robber); Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(pubic hair found in rape investigation); United States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331 (2d
Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (hair found in hat worn by armed robber); United States ex
rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Del. 1972) (pubic hair found in rape-
murder investigation), ajf'dper curiar, 481 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1072 (1973); State v. Cobb, 295 N.C. 1, 243 S.E.2d 759 (1978) (pubic hair found in
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The desired evidence must also be necessary,7° a means
of determining an essential element of the crime.71 How-
ever, this necessity requirement is not absolute; the degree of
necessity required should increase as the degree of bodily
intrusion increases.72 In the case of a nontechnical search,73
the need element will be satisfied where the search is a
means of proving an element of the offense. For example, in
United States v. Weir74 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the comparison of Weir's hair to hair inside the
bank robber's ski mask was a means of establishing iden-
tity.75 When a routine medical procedure76 is required, the
government must show a higher degree of need. In Schmer-
ber v. Calfornia77 the Supreme Court approved of the ex-
traction of a blood sample because it was virtually the only
"highly effective means of determining the degree to which a
person is under the influence of alcohol. ' 78 A more complex
rape investigation); State v. Sharpe, 284 N.C. 157, 200 S.E.2d 44 (1973) (hair found
under murder victim's fingernail); State v. Downes, 57 N.C. App. 102, 291 S.E.2d 186
(hair found in glove and mask worn by murderer), cert. denied, 306 N.C. 388, 294
S.E.2d 213 (1982); Faulkner v. State, 646 P.2d 1304 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (hair
found in mask worn by armed robber); Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 337
A.2d 573 (pubic hair found in murder victim's bedroom where murderer was thought
to have engaged in homosexual relations with the victim), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934
(1975); Patterson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (facial and head
hair found at scene of rape); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980) (rapist's
head hair found on victim's bed).
70. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.1(d), at 12-20.
71. The element will often be identity or possession of narcotics. See supra notes
54-69 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 7.
74. 657 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
75. See id. at 1007. For additional cases, see supra note 69.
76. See supra note 7.
77. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
78. See id. at 771. "'[T]he need to search'. . . was an extremely important factor
in Schmerber. The Court approved the taking of a blood sample only because it was
'a highly effective means' of determining an essential element of the crime of which
the defendant was suspected." 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.1(d), at 19.
A blood sample to be used for comparison of blood types must also be a means of
establishing an element. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa.
1972); State v. Acquin, 177 Conn. 352, 416 A.2d 1209 (1979) (per curiam); Cole v.
Parr, 595 P.2d 1349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979). In Allen the district court denied the
government's motion for an order compelling the defendant to submit to a blood test
because the government did not establish a link between the evidence and an element
of bank robbery. 337 F. Supp. at 1044. In Acquin the Connecticut Supreme Court
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medical procedure,79 however, requires an even stronger
showing of necessity. Although the bullet recovered in
United States v. Crowder80 suggested the defendant was
present at the scene of the crime, the bullet was not neces-
sary to establish this fact. An accomplice testified as to
Crowder's presence, and the defendant conceded the issue.81
As Professor LaFave has commented, "[t]he Crowder deci-
sion is most vulnerable on this score." 82
C. What is the Degree of Intrusion of the Defendant's
Body?
Degree of bodily intrusion should be evaluated in terms
of the nature of the test,8 3 the manner in which it is per-
reversed an order compelling the defendant to submit a blood test where the govern-
ment failed to establish "that the 'substance' found on the alleged murder weapons
was in fact blood .... ." 177 Conn. at __ 416 A.2d at 1211. In Cole the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed an order compelling the defendant to submit to a
blood test because, without knowing that the other blood specimen was of human
origin, was not the victim's, and was from the scene of the crime, the proposed blood
test would not establish any element of rape or assault and battery. 595 P.2d at 1351.
A blood test is not of such an intrusive degree so as to demand absolute necessity.
See, e.g., Brichfield v. State, 412 So. 2d 1181, 1183-84 (Miss. 1982) (sample taken for
identity purposes reasonable despite fact that the only issue in dispute was rape vic-
tim's consent); Ferguson v. State, 573 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)
("Given the wealth of evidence of appellant's guilt, we conclude that the admission in
evidence of the blood sample was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt."), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979).
79. See supra note 7.
80. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
81. 543 F.2d at 318 (Leventhal, J., dissenting); id at 322 (Robinson, J., dissent-
ing).
Surgery may be unnecessary where there are more than enough facts demonstrat-
ing the defendant's guilt. In fact, the "circumstances suggesting a clear indication that
the desired evidence will be obtained through surgery may also demonstrate a clear
indication of a defendant's guilt and thereby eliminate the need for surgical intru-
sion." Note, United States v. Crowder, 55 TEx. L. REV. 147, 156 (1976).
No matter how great the need, major surgery should not be authorized. See infra
note 102.
82. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.1(d), at 19 (footnote omitted).
The majority never discussed the need factor at all, apparently because it was
thought sufficient that 'the evidence sought was relevant' and 'could have been
obtained in no other way.' Had the need part of the Schmerber formula been
taken into account, the court would likely have come out the other way.
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. See infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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formed,84 and the availability of less intrusive alternatives.85
The United States Supreme Court set forth the criteria for a
reasonable test in Schmerber v. Calfornia.8 6  First, the test
must be a reliable means of establishing the fact sought.8 7
While the test in Schmerber was a highly effective means of
determining blood-alcohol content, 88 other scientific tests are
highly circumstantial and speculative. For example, in Peo-
ple v. Scott89 the California Supreme Court concluded that a
test designed to detect trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted
disease, lacked reliability:
The People's showing was that the procedure had "approx-
imately a seventy percent probability" of demonstrating
whether defendant had trichomoniasis; at trial it was ex-
plained that "positive" results were a reliable indicator of
the infection, but that if the results were "negative" there
remained a 30 percent statistical chance that the infection
was nonetheless present. Thus, not only was the procedure
not a "highly effective means" of establishing the presence
or absence of trichomoniasis, its unreliability was biased
against the defendant. 90
Second, the acts involved in administering the test must
be routine or "commonplace." 91 On the one hand, it is obvi-
ous that cutting hair,9 z washing hands,93 cleaning finger-
85. See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
86. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra notes 18-25.
87. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
88. Id.
89. 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978). In Scott the defend-
ant was convicted of incest and child molestation. Part of the evidence related to a
medical test for trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted disease. The test was
prompted by an examination of his daughter revealing the presence of the disease. It
consisted of a fifteen minute, manual massage of the prostate gland administered
through the rectum, resulting in a discharge of semen. The results of defendant's test
were negative, but did reveal a chronic prostate inflammation, of which trichomonia-
sis was one of the three probable causes. 21 Cal. 3d at 288-89, 578 P.2d at 124-25, 145
Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
90. Id. at 295, 578 P.2d at 128, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
91. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
92. But forcibly plucking pubic hair is not as routine. See, e.g., Bouse v. Bussey,
573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (police officers restrained defendant, unzip-
ped his jail uniform, and forcibly plucked his pubic hair); State v. Gammill, 2 Kan.
App. 2d 627, 585 P.2d 1074 (1978) (about twenty-five pubic hairs were "yanked" from
defendant's body).
93. The analogous procedure is swabbing the skin with chemically treated cotton.
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94 95 96 i otnnails,94 and giving a urine or blood sample is a routine
occurrence in our society. On the other hand, it is less obvi-
ous that a manual massage of the prostate gland adminis-
tered through the rectum, 97  a procedure inducing
regurgitation,98 or any surgical procedure" is routine. The
same distinction appears with respect to the final Schmerber
criterion for a reasonable test: "that for most people the pro-
cedure involves virtually no risk, trauma or pain."' 00 The
routine occurrences typically involve minor discomfort,
while the more complicated procedures "involve much more
in the way of physical and mental discomfort and anxiety
[and] pose significantly higher risks of infection and post-
[procedure] complications, and an immensely greater per-
sonal affront."101 In these situations, the proper standard for
both the commonplace and freedom from risk and pain cri-
94. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (fingernail scraping was a
"very limited intrusion").
95. But forced catheterization is not as routine. But see Yanez v. Romero, 619
F.2d 851 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876 (1980), in which the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals found no constitutional violation in a police officer's threat to cathe-
terize the defendant. "[T]he threat is not quite the same as the actual invasion." Id.
at 855-56. See infra notes 140-50.
96. The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday life. It is a
ritual for those going into the military service as well as those applying for
marriage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before permitting entrance
and literally millions of us have voluntarily gone through the same, though a
longer routine in becoming blood donors.
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957).
97. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876
(1978).
98. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
Stomach searching can be accomplished by various means. The simplest
method is to have the subject merely swallow an emetic solution if he or she is
willing. Otherwise, the solution must be introduced into the stomach by means
of a tube inserted into the stomach through the nostril. Regurgitation has also
been compelled by injecting apomorphine into the blood stream by hypoder-
mic needle. It can be produced by the administration of a saline solution or
epsom salt. The suspect is thus caused to regurgitate any contraband con-
tained in the stomach.
Comment, Stomach Searches, supra note 8, at 93 n.2.
99. See supra note 27.
100. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The question of how much force may accom-
pany a given procedure is a separate issue from the question of how painful the proce-
dure is. Any procedure accompanied by excessive force may become painful. See
infra notes 140-50.
101. United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(Robinson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
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teria is whether virtually anyone in the defendant's position
would submit to the procedure, absent a desire to deprive
the prosecution of the evidence. 0 2
The performance of the test also affects the degree of in-
trusion. The Schmerber Court found that a blood sample
"taken by a physician in a hospital environment according
to accepted medical practices" was extracted in a reasonable
manner. 0 3 Certainly, the same precautions must be taken
for more complex medical procedures, such as the minor
surgery performed in United States v. Crowder.10 4 But where
a nontechnical procedure is utilized, many courts, but not
all, 0 5 omit these stringent medical requirements since "[tihe
102. This standard is an extension of Professor LaFave's surgical procedure stan-
dard. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.1(d), at 16 ("It would seem, however, that
certain surgical procedures are so minor that they are 'commonplace' in the sense that
virtually anyone finding himself in Crowder's position would (absent the desire to
deprive the authorities of the evidence) have sought removal of the bullet."). There is
no reason such a standard would not work equally well in those situations in which a
certain procedure becomes routinely conducted given a set of medical circumstances.
This standard would also preclude major surgery on the basis of the prosecution's
need for the evidence. It could not be reasoned that "virtually anyone" whose life
was not threatened by the presence of a bullet would seek removal of it through a
procedure where death was an inherent risk. Cf. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.1(d),
at 18 ("certainly nothing more than minor surgery should be permitted no matter how
great the need."); Comment, Compelled Surgery, supra note 8, at 315 ("The showing
of attendant risk is so strong [where major surgery is proposed] as to render any at-
tempted removal unreasonable per se."); Note, Nonconsensual Surgery, supra note 8,
at 303 ("Nonconsensual major surgery should be a per se violation of both the fourth
and fourteenth amendment.").
103. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. Accord State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, _, 230
A.2d 384, 386 (1967). See also United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp.
193 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (search of vaginal cavity was unreasonable where not performed
by medically trained person in medical environment with medical equipment). But
see, e.g., State v. Carthan, 377 So. 2d 308 (La. 1979) (taking of blood sample by lab
technician, not physician, was reasonable).
104. 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977). See supra text accompanying note 31 for the court's language.
105. See, e.g., State v. Gammill, 2 Kan. App. 2d 627, __ 585 P.2d 1074, 1077
(1978) ("Furthermore, provisions could have been made for a physician or medical
technician to obtain the [pubic hair] sample under circumstances which would afford
the defendant the dignity to which every person is entitled under his presumption of
innocence."). See also People v. Rankins, 81 Mich. App. 694, 265 N.W.2d 792 (1978)
(hair samples taken by doctor in hospital where defendant was being treated follow-
ing a high speed automobile accident).
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simplicity of the test makes it unnecessary to have it con-
ducted by a physician."' 1 6
However, a reasonable test that is reasonably performed
does not necessarily ensure that the degree of bodily intru-
sion is insignificant. The availability of less intrusive alter-
natives must be considered. 10 7  In nontechnical procedure
cases, this concern will rarely be a problem since the intru-
sion itself is so minor. 10 8 And only in limited cases will it be
unreasonable to administer a blood-alcohol test when a
breathalyzer test'0 9 or the admission of the defendant's re-
fusal to submit to such a blood test' 0 is available."'I But in
complex medical procedure cases the alternatives become
much more important. Courts have recognized that induced
regurgitation should never be resorted to where the drugs in
the defendant's stomach are known to be stored in an insolu-
ble container" 2 and are expected to pass safely through the
digestive tract.' '3 And the Crowder decision mandates that
106. United States v. Smith, 470 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). In
Smith the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, partly on
the basis of a benzidine test. The test entailed "swabbing the suspected area with
cotton that has been saturated with water. The cotton is then immersed in a benzi-
dine solution. . . . Even the most minute quantity of blood will trigger [a color-
change] reaction." Id. at 378 n.3. The test was positive indicating the presence of
blood on the defendant's penis. Id. at 377-79. See also United States v. Weir, 657
F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (reasonable search where FBI agents combed
and plucked the defendant's head, beard, and mustache for hair samples); United
States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.) (reasonable search where FBI agents
swabbed the defendant's hand in order to determine the presence of dynamite parti-
cles), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010 (1974).
107. An officer faced with alternative means of obtaining evidence must use the
most reasonable one. Comment, Stomach Searches, supra note 8, at 99.
108. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. 363, 324 A.2d 452
(1974); State v. Swiderski, 94 N.J. Super. 14, 226 A.2d 728 (1967).
110. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
111. Such a case may involve one who refuses on "grounds of fear, concern for
health, or religious scruple." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The Schmerber decision
left the issue undecided. Id
Where only the defendant's blood type is desired for comparison purposes,
records containing this medical information may be a reasonable alternative if
available.
112. Such as a balloon or condom. If it is thought that the narcotics would soon
be absorbed into the defendant's digestive system, a procedure utilizing water instead
of an emetic should be used. See People v. Jones, 20 Cal. App. 3d 201, 205, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 492, 494 (1971) ("in the case of barbituric intoxication, the use of an emetic can
cause deepening of an impending coma.").
113. See, e.g., People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 403-04, 540 P.2d 624, 630-
31, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528, 534-35 (1975) ("It thus appears that defendant in the instant
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compelled surgery never be performed where there is any al-
ternative available.'1 4
D. Tfhat Procedural Safeguards are Required?
In Schmerber v. California"15 the United States Supreme
Court established a general rule requiring warrants when the
dignity of the human body is threatened:
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of
dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be re-
quired where intrusions into the human body are con-
cerned .... The importance of informed, detached and
deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to in-
vade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indis-
putable and great." 6
Some courts have refused to apply this rule to such a mi-
nor intrusion as the taking of a hair sample. 1 7 They argue
that "the simple extraction of hair samples from the body of
an accused is so minimal and unintrusive as to be a reason-
able search, even absent a warrant for the purpose."' " 8 But
other courts have required search warrants since "hairs may
be expected to remain where they are for a considerable pe-
case easily could have been transported to jail and placed in an isolation cell and kept
under proper surveillance."); People v. Rodriguez, 71 Cal. App. 3d 547, 557-58, 139
Cal. Rptr. 509, 514 (1977) ("Nothing in this record justifies any conclusion but that,
had the normal processes of digestion and elimination been allowed to take their
course, the balloons would have been recovered and defendant been healthy."). See
generally Comment, Stomach Searches, supra note 8, at 98-102.
114. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316. See supra text accompanying note 31 for the
court's language. Despite the lack of an alternative, major surgery should never be
authorized. See supra note 102.
115. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
116. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. Accord Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.)
(warrant required for testing of blood type), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970); State v.
Clark, - Hawaii _, 654 P.2d 355 (1982) (a body cavity search without a warrant is
presumptively unreasonable).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Weir, 657 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
United States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam); State v. Brierly,
109 Ariz. 310, 509 P.2d 203 (1973); State v. Downes, 57 N.C. App. 102, 291 S.E.2d
186, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 388, 294 S.E.2d 213 (1982); Faulkner v. State, 646 P.2d
1304 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980).
118. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980).
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riod of time - certainly long enough to obtain a valid
search warrant. ... 119
On the other hand, where a surgical procedure is in-
volved, much more than a search warrant is required.1 20 The
procedural requirements of United States v. Crowder'2 1 de-
mand that the defendant be afforded an adversary hearing
with right to counsel and an opportunity for appellate review
prior to the operation. 122 Any decision to permit the surgery
is to be a court's, not a surgeon's, because "surgical proce-
dures are frequently subjects of divergent medical opinions
as to their complexity and the seriousness of the risks
involved."'' 23
E. Are There any Exigent Circumstances?
A search that would ordinarily be considered unreasona-
ble may be justified by the exigent circumstances presented
in the case. These circumstances typically involve the possi-
ble destruction of evidence, 2 4 a threat to life, 25 or the use of
force. 2 6
The destruction of evidence concern may result from the
nature of the evidence itself or the potential actions of the
defendant. Although Schmerber v. Calfornia127 set forth a
general rule requiring a search warrant for intrusions upon
the human body, 28 the Supreme Court excused noncompli-
119. State v. Gammill, 2 Kan. App. 2d 627, ., 585 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1978). Ac-
cord Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Commonwealth v.
Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 337 A.2d 573, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975).
120. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 4.1(d), at 20-21; Comment, Com-
pelled Surgery, supra note 8, at 317; Note, Nonconsensual Surgery, supra note 8, at 302-
04.
121. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
122. See id. at 316. See supra text accompanying note 31 for the court's language.
123. Crowder, 543 F.2d at 323 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Ac-
cord State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977). In Overstreet the trial court,
without an evidentiary hearing, ordered a doctor to remove a bullet from the defend-
ant's buttocks if, after examining him, the physician felt removal would not endanger
defendant's health, safety, or life. The doctor administered a local anesthetic and
removed the bullet. 551 S.W.2d at 623-24. In reversing the defendant's conviction for
first degree robbery and murder, the Missouri Supreme Court chastized the trial court
for not following the procedural requirements applied in Schmerber. Id. at 627-28.
124. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
127. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra notes 18-25.
128. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
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ance with the rule in that case. The Court reasoned that
since blood-alcohol content dissipates shortly after drinking
stops, the threatened destruction of intoxication evidence
presented "no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a
warrant."' 29 And in Cupp v. Murphy 30 the Supreme Court
held that a fingernail scraping was a reasonable search
where the defendant could have destroyed the evidence and
had actually attempted to do so.' 3'
A particular search may also be reasonable where a
threat to human life is involved. In Bell v. Wolfish132 the
United States Supreme Court approved visual body cavity
129. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed that
he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the destruction of evidence"
.... Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evi-
dence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an approximate incident to
petitioner's arrest.
Id. at 770-71 (citation omitted). See Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138, _, 310 N.E.2d
571, 578 (1974) ("It is a physiological fact that narcotic drugs, like alcohol, will dimin-
ish or disappear as the human body eliminates it from the system." Urinalysis re-
vealing morphine in violation of probation conditions was reasonable.). See also
People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 404, 540 P.2d 624, 631, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528, 535
(1975) ("If, in the instant case, there was reasonable cause to believe that the balloons
would not pass through the digestive tract but instead would break open and thereby
dissipate ... the fear of the destruction of evidence might also justify [the intrusion
into defendant's stomach].). But see People v. Rodriguez, 71 Cal. App. 3d 547, 139
Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977) (no exigent circumstances where narcotics in stomach were
known to have been in a balloon); State v. Clark, - Hawaii ._ 654 P.2d 355 (1982)
(no exigent circumstances since money secreted in vaginal cavity would not dissipate);
State v. Fontenot, 383 So. 2d 365 (La. 1980) (no exigent circumstances since narcotics
secreted in vaginal cavity were known to have been in a bottle).
130. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
131. Id. at 296. See United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.) (dynamite
particles on defendant's hands could easily have been removed by washing his
hands), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010 (1974); United States v. Smith, 470 F.2d 377 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (blood on defendant's penis could have been destroyed by a
thorough washing); Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968) (blood on defend-
ant's penis), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1123 (1969). ButyeeCupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,
304 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (warrant requirement is not excused where de-
fendant could be detained and prevented from destroying the evidence); State v.
Clark, - Hawaii ., 654 P.2d 355 (1982) (defendant could have been precluded from
destroying the money secreted in her vaginal cavity); State v. Fontenot, 383 So. 2d 365
(La. 1980) (defendant could have been precluded from destroying the narcotics se-
creted in her vaginal cavity).
132. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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searches 133 of pretrial detainees conducted on less than prob-
able cause.1 34 The Court reasoned that since "[a] detention
facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dan-
gers," these searches properly deterred and detected the
smuggling of weapons into the facility.135 But some searches
are designed to protect the life of the defendant subjected to
the search. 36 For example, in United States v. Owens137 the
authorities arrested a man suspected of secreting narcotics in
his stomach. When the man lapsed into a semi-conscious or
unconscious state, they took him to a hospital and directed a
physician to "pump"1 38 the man's stomach. The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant could not
complain that his rights were violated because the "officers
acted in good faith to prevent further harm to him."' 3 9
Exigent circumstances may also justify the use of force to
effectuate a search. 40  The defendant's "resistance alone
does not make an otherwise proper search illegal."1 4 1 Also,
"the use of a reasonable amount of force by the government,
in conjunction with the use of a reasonable method in exe-
133. "If the inmate is male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his
buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates also
are visually inspected." Id. at 558 n.39. The searches followed "every contact visit
with a person from outside the institution." Id. at 558 (footnote omitted).
134. Id at 560.
135. Id at 559. The Court was also concerned with the smuggling of money,
drugs, and other contraband. Id
136. These cases typically arise when narcotics concealed in the stomach or vagi-
nal or anal cavities threaten to be absorbed in the defendant's digestive system.
137. 475 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
138. See supra note 98.
139. Owens, 475 F.2d at 760. See People v. Jones, 20 Cal. App. 3d 201, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (1971) (physician was motivated by concern for defendant's life; no police
direction).
140. See generally Comment, Stomach Searches, supra note 8, at 104-06.
Use of force, as a factor of reasonableness, is closely related to the proposition
that a procedure used to seize evidence should involve virtually no risk, pain
or trauma. However, the latter refers only to pain and trauma inherent in the
procedure; whereas, the former refers to conduct which is itself necessary to
effect the search. Both the terms "force" and "pain" are difficult of precise
definition - the degree and kind that are permissible vary widely with differ-
ent facts.
Id. at 104-05.
141. People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 406, 540 P.2d 624, 632, 124 Cal. Rptr.
528, 536 (1975).
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cuting the search . . . is constitutionally permissible."1 42
However, use of force is constrained by both due process re-
quirements 43 and medical risk. 44
In Rochin v. Calfornia145 the United States Supreme
Court manifested the due process constraint. There, the
Court was confronted with a course of events in which police
officers illegally broke into the defendant's bedroom, strug-
gled to open his mouth and remove what was there, and
compelled a physician to forcibly extract what he had swal-
lowed. 46 The Court reversed the defendant's conviction for
possession of a narcotic and chastised the government for
wielding "force so brutal and so offensive to human dig-
nity." 47 Lower courts have similarly held searches to be un-
reasonable when the police conduct did not "afford the
defendant the dignity to which every person is entitled under
his presumption of innocence."' 148
The second constraint on the use of force to effectuate a
search is the prohibition that the procedure become medi-
142. People v. Holloway, 416 Mich. 288, _, 330 N.W.2d 405, 409 (1982), cer.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1900 (1983).
143. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. The fifth amendment pro-
vides: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For the language of the fourteenth
amendment, see supra note 13.
144. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
145. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
146. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
147. Id at 174.
148. State v. Gammill, 2 Kan. App. 2d 627, _, 585 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1978) (forci-
bly "yanking" about twenty-five pubic hairs from the defendant was unreasonable).
AccordBouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (forcibly plucking
pubic hairs was unreasonable); United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.C.
1957) (restraining defendant by twisting his arms violated fifth amendment due pro-
cess). But see Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 851 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876
(1980). In Yanez the defendant, who was under surveillance, entered a service station
restroom. State police burst into the room where they saw a recently used hypoder-
mic needle and fresh needlemarks on defendant's arm. Defendant was arrested and
transported to a hospital for a urine sample. Defendant refused but subsequently
submitted after being threatened with catheterization. The sample revealed the pres-
ence of morphine, and the defendant was convicted of unlawful possession. Id at
851. A two-to-one majority of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
viction, holding that the threat alone, absent any actual violence or brutality, did not
violate the Rochin due process standard. Id. at 854-56. Judge McKay dissented, ar-
guing that Rochin condemned threatened indignities along with the actual conduct.
Id. at 856 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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cally unsafe. 149 "If the defendant chooses to resist [a proce-
dure], the physician performing the test together with other
authorized personnel may take such medically appropriate
steps as they would use to control any difficult patient; [but]
inappropriate force is condemned."' 5 °
IV. CONCLUSION
In the context of the human body, the fourth amend-
ment's challenge is to reconcile dignity with justice. It must
afford an environment of privacy in which personal dignity
may flourish. But it must also prevent this environment
from becoming a refuge for those who would ask the crimi-
nal justice system to ignore appropriate evidence. To answer
this challenge, the fourth amendment must restrict bodily in-
trusions to only limited situations and in only a limited man-
ner. The vehicle for this accommodation is "reason-
ableness."
A search designed to procure evidence from the human
body must be reasonable given the facts and circumstances
presented. The search should not be initiated unless there
exists a high probability, or "clear indication," that the de-
sired evidence will be produced. This evidence must be rele-
vant to the offense charged and a means of determining an
essential element of that offense; the degree of necessity
should increase as does the degree of intrusion. The degree
of intrusion must be as limited as reasonably practical; only
a reasonable procedure that is performed in a reasonable
manner and in the absence of any less intrusive alternative
may be sanctioned. A search warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate should be required unless the societal interests in
preserving evidence and human life demand more immedi-
ate action. When minor surgical procedures are to be em-
ployed, a court order based on strict necessity must be
granted only after an adversary hearing with counsel; fur-
thermore, there must be an opportunity for appellate review.
149. See Comment, Stomach Searches, supra note 8, at 106.
150. State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, _ 230 A.2d 384, 388 (1967). See People v.
Duemig, - Colo. _ 620 P.2d 240 (1980) (although force was used to restrain de-
fendant, the blood sample was not unsafe under the circumstances), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 971 (1981).
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And the use of force to effectuate the search must remain
humane and medically appropriate. Such a concept of rea-
sonableness promotes the interests of our society by preserv-
ing the individual's privacy interest and the government's
need for evidence.
DAVID C. SARNACKI

